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There has been a reappraisal of phylogenetic issues in cognitive science, as
reconstructing cognitive phylogenies has been considered a key for unveiling the
cognitive novelties that set the stage for what makes humans special. In our opinion,
the studies made until now have approached cognitive phylogenies in a non-optimal
way, and we wish to both highlight their problems, drawing on recent considerations
in philosophy of biology. The inadequacy of current visions on cognitive phylogenies
stems from the influence of the traditional “linear cladograms,” according to which every
seemingly new or more sophisticated feature of a cognitive mechanism, viewed as a
novelty, is represented as a node on top of the old and shared elements. We claim that
this kind of cladograms does not succeed in depicting the complexity with which traits
are distributed across species and, furthermore, that the labels of the nodes of these
traditional representational systems fail to capture the “tinkering” nature of evolution. We
argue that if we are to conceive of cognitive mechanisms in a multi-dimensional, bottom-
up perspective, in accordance with the Darwinian logic of descent, we should rather
focus on decomposing these mechanisms into lower-level, generic functions, which
have the additional advantage of being implementable in neural matter, which ultimately
produces cognition. Doing so renders current constructions of cognitive phylogenies
otiose.
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As de Waal and Ferrari (2010) observed, for the past few decades comparative cognitive research
has focused “on the pinnacles of mental evolution,” asking “all-or-nothing questions such as
which animals (if any) possess a theory of mind, culture, linguistic abilities, future planning,
and so on.” De Waal and Ferrari remark that “research programs adopting this top-down
perspective have often pitted one taxon against another, resulting in sharp dividing lines.” As a
result, “insight into the underlying mechanisms has lagged behind (...).” Although de Waal and
Ferrari add that “a dramatic change in focus now seems to be under way, . . . , with increased
appreciation that the basic building blocks of cognition might be shared across a wide range of
species,” we think that remnants of “top-down” thinking remain very influential to this day. We
would like to show this by examining what we take to be the dominant conception of cognitive
phylogenies, well-articulated in Fitch et al. (2010) (see also Hauser et al., 2002, and the numerous
proposals concerning “proto-language” stages, usefully synthesized in Fitch, 2010). Specifically, we
want to stress the tension between the information represented in these cognitive phylogenies
and the bottom-up thinking that we believe captures the Darwinian logic of descent best.
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We agree with de Waal and Ferrari that the “bottom-
up perspective, which focuses on the constituent capacities
underlying larger cognitive phenomena, is more in line with both
neuroscience and evolutionary biology.” As such, the bottom-
up perspective has greater integrative potential, and should be
favored.
As Fitch et al. (2010) point out at the outset of their paper,
domains like “language and social cognition” are “complex
constructs, involving many independent cognitive mechanisms.”
We could not agree more with them that in order to shed light
on the evolution of such mechanisms, the comparative approach
provides a powerful route. But in order to be successful, this
approach must find the right level of comparative granularity,
an issue that vitiates current attempts to construct cognitive
phylogenies, for reasons we are about to discuss.
Ravignani et al. (2014) are right to stress that a monolithic
viewpoint leads naturally to unhelpful questions, such as “when
did language evolve?” (suggesting that this happened during
one brief moment in human evolutionary history) or “where
is language located in the brain?” (as if this complex cognitive
ability occupies a single cortical region). Correctly, they see a
“divide and conquer” strategy as the antidote to this monolithic
conception: one must recognize that “any complex cognitive
capability relies upon a suite of interacting cognitive capabilities.
Each of these capabilities may have its own neural bases and
independent evolutionary history.”
Although this “divide-and-conquer” strategy appears to be
in line with de Waal and Ferrari’s “bottom-up” approach, we
don’t think that they have been fully integrated with one another
yet, because of how researchers continue to think of (cognitive)
evolutionary novelties.
As can be gathered from the “proto-language” literature (first,
the “lexicon” then “syntax,” as in the “lexical protolanguage”
proposal; or first “sign” then “speech,” as in the “gestural
protolanguage proposal’ see Fitch, 2010 for extensive references),
or even more clearly in Hauser et al. (2002) distinction between
“the faculty of language in the broad sense” and “the faculty
of language in the narrow sense,” current examples of cognitive
phylogenies mostly tend to view every seemingly new or more
sophisticated aspect of a cognitive faculty (properly decomposed)
as a novelty, whose emergence leads to add a new ingredient
(represented as a node) on top of the old and shared elements.
Thus, Hauser et al. (2002)’s distinction between the Faculty of
Language in the Broad and in the Narrow Sense was intended
to make exactly this point, as non-shared elements were thought
to bring out the element that led to the emergence of human
language.
It is in this sense that current cognitive phylogenetic studies
operate in opposition to both evolutionary thinking, which
stresses descent, and also to contemporary attempts to ground
cognitive capacities onto basic neurophysiological principles.
These seek to provide a decomposition or fractionation of a
particular cognitive domain into formal operations that are, in
the words of Poeppel (2005), “elemental and generic.” Why
should they be “elemental and generic”? Well, simply because
this is the nature of the information coming from bottom-
up approaches, grounded in what genes provide (Boeckx and
Theofanopoulou, 2014, 2015). Since they are generic, these
operations will be shared, across species, across cognitive
domains, etc. As a result, they are not appropriate to draw
cognitive phylogenies (i.e., to capture the cognitive branching
off of species needed to adorn traditional phylogenetic trees
with cognitive capacities). Conversely, the cognitive descriptions
used to construct cognitive phylogenies are bound to retain a
top-down, contrastive character.
To a certain extent, this last claim should not come as a
surprise. After all, traditional representations of phylogenies,
such as the only illustration gracing Darwin’s Origin of Species,
are inherently contrastive, as they focus on how species branched
off from a common ancestor. Tree-like representations are
meant to capture what made population A become distinct
from population B, and when. Given that attempts to construct
cognitive phylogenies boil down to attempts to graft cognitive
traits onto independently established phylogenetic trees, as Fitch
et al. (2010) made clear, it is to be expected that they too will tend
to adopt a contrastive character, seeking to highlight a novel trait
that makes the cognitive profile of population A different from
that of population B.
But we very much doubt that cognition can be studied
independently of the basic neurophysiological principles that
produce it. As Tinbergen (1963) already stressed in his
programmatic essay on ethology, no evolutionary adequate
account of cognitive capacities can afford to ignore the brain
mechanisms underlying mental capacities.
More andmore, comparative approaches that adopt a bottom-
up perspective reach the conclusion that “the distinction between
general and (...) specialized mechanisms is hard to draw.”
Indeed, “the distinction itself is of little use in furthering our
understanding of the mechanisms” (Fitch, 2011). In other words,
the more we learn about the mechanisms, and the more we set
our focus on identifying them, the harder it becomes to capture
cognitive specializations in a meaningful way, let alone represent
them in a tree-like fashion. Put another way, the bottom-up
perspective makes it hard to capture “cognitive speciation,” which
is exactly what cognitive phylogenies represent.
To illustrate the tension that occupies us, consider briefly
the following two examples. One shows how a shared brain
mechanism can underlie distinct cognitive phenotypes; the
other shows how the same phenotype can be subserved by
distinct brain mechanisms. Both are equally problematic to draw
cognitive cladograms, in as much as these are meant to remain
true to the nature of cognition (which is brain-based).
The first example is the case of the speech rhythms
found in humans. Following original insights from MacNeilage
(collected in MacNeilage, 2008), as well as substantial progress
in characterizing the brain basis of speech (Giraud and Poeppel,
2012), comparative research has focused on the phenomenon
of lip smacking, an affiliative signal observed in many genera
of primates. This facial expression exhibits a speech-like
rhythm in the 3- to 8-Hz frequency range. Studies using
developmental, x-ray cineradiographic, EMG, and perceptual
approaches with non-human primates, reviewed in Ghazanfar
and Poeppel (2014), converge on the hypothesis that the brain
rhythm (“mechanism”) underlying lip-smacking was recruited
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for purposes of speech. Specifically, lip-smacking was linked
to vocal output to produce the original rhythmic audiovisual
speech-like utterances in the human lineage. Clearly, cognitively
speaking, lip-smacking is not speech (Martins and Boeckx, 2014).
Speech is in fact something that attempts to construct cognitive
phylogenies would like to use to capture “cognitive speciation”
events, as it were [think of Liberman’s (1985) “speech is special”
hypothesis, which continues to be at the heart of debates such as
Hauser et al. (2002) vs. Pinker and Jackendoff (2005)]. But doing
so would miss the neural basis of speech. Worse, the mechanism
underlying lip-smacking itself (brain oscillation in the theta-
frequency range) is not specific to this behavior (see Buzsáki
et al., 2013 on the conservation of brain rhythms in mammals).
As a result, we face a paradoxical situation when attempting to
represent all this information in a tree-like format: speech is
special, but the mechanism underlying it is deeply-rooted. Even
if one appeals to another level of description to characterize
speech (e.g., the “dynomic” description of theta-nested gamma
oscillations), we still face the problem that these neural rhythms,
and their nested relations, are shared across species and cognitive
domains.
The second example comes from another domain of
neuroethology. It concerns the representation of the
environment from unreliable sensory cues, a brain function
that is vital for survival. Humans and other animals use the
interaural time difference (ITD) for sound localization. ITD is
the difference in the arrival time of a sound at the ears. ITD
results from unequal distances of a sound source to the two
ears when the source is to the left or to the right of the listener.
Grothe and colleagues have specified the mechanism of ITD in
great neural detail in various species (see Grothe and Pecka,
2014 for an overview). We will not go into this here. Rather,
what we want to stress is a finding reported in Lesica et al.
(2010): For decades, it was assumed that the coding of ITDs
in the mammalian brain was similar to that in the avian brain,
where information is known to be sparsely distributed across
individual neurons. Lesica et al. compare the representation of
ITDs in adult male and female gerbils and in adult male and
female barn owls. For gerbils, they used different decoders to
infer ITDs from the activity of a population of neurons in central
nucleus of the inferior colliculus. On the basis of this, they
concluded that ITDs are not represented in a distributed manner,
but rather in the summed activity of the entire population.
The same analysis was performed on activity from the external
nucleus of the inferior colliculus of adult male and female barn
owls, which confirmed that in this case, ITDs were represented
in a distributed manner. In sum, unlike the avian brain, the
mammalian brain represents ITDs in the overall activity of a
homogenous population of neurons within each hemisphere.
Both the avian and the mammalian brains represent ITDs, so
again we face a paradoxical situation. A cognitive phylogenetic
tree would like to capture this similarity, but doing so would
obscure the mechanistic differences underlying it.
Clearly, in both illustrations just discussed, it would be
unsatisfactory to entertain distinct “cognitive phylogenies,”
one capturing information at the phenotypic level, and
another, information at the level of mechanism, for cognition
characterizes itself by the integration of information from various
levels. It cannot be dissociated from its underlying neural
mechanisms. This is, we believe, the essential lesson of Marr
(1982). Marr urged cognitive neuroscientists to combine (and not
contrast) information from various levels (three levels for him;
for a more refined view as to which levels should be taken on
board, see Boeckx and Theofanopoulou, 2014; Figure 1).
The larger point we want to make is that current attempts to
construct cognitive phylogenies appear inherently incapable of
capturing how evolution really works, specifically how novelties
arise. Evolution does not work in a “yes or no” way, but rather
tinkering what already exists, either transfiguring a system to give
it a new function or modulating several systems to produce a
more complex one. Of course, there is modification along the
path of descent, but the modified aspect and the shared aspect
are inextricably linked.
As discussed extensively in Balari and Lorenzo (2015) and
the references cited therein (especially Wagner, 2014), the root
of the problem lies in how one thinks of evolutionary novelties.
Evolution, generally, and evolution of cognition, specifically, does
not operate in a simplistic innovative way; rather, it reorganizes
already existing generic mechanisms, recruiting them into new
uses. We could liken the way that evolution works to “discovery”
as opposed to “invention.” Novelty does not arise as a de novo
invention, but as a tinkering-discovery of how generic operations
could be combined, so that their collective effects stand as an
apparent de novo trait [As a reviewer notes, this idea is very
much in line with Reid’s (2007) vision of evolution as “natural
experiment”]. Classical cladograms, of the sort Fitch et al. (2010)
borrowed to draw their cognitive phylogenies, fail to take into
consideration evolution’s essential tinkering nature. As a reviewer
points out, it is worth bearing in mind that the aim of cladistics
is, after all, to reconstruct natural relationships of organisms (not
necessarily phylogenies) by means of certain key traits that are
used for diagnostic purposes only. That is to say, cladistics is
not originally intended as a model to trace the phylogeny of the
corresponding traits (or lack thereof), let alone to speak to their
mechanistic causes.
Another problem for current examples of cognitive
phylogenies is that they appear to suffer from what Balari
and Lorenzo (2013) called the “functionalist fallacy.” They
focus on functions, but should also specify the mechanisms.
Even if we decompose complex cognitive traits like language
or social cognition, their component parts—altruistic behavior,
empathy, mimicry vs. imitation, gaze following, and the
like—still remain top-down terms. As de Waal and Ferrari
(2010, p. 202) put it: “Outcomes are important from an
evolutionary perspective in that they determine an organism’s
success at dealing with its environment, but from a cognitive
perspective they are mere surface phenomena. Unique outcomes
do not always reflect unique processes.” Indeed, inquiring
whether a species performs or not a specific “outcome,” such
as geometric gaze following or Theory of Mind (as suggested
in Fitch et al., 2010) does not yield much insight into the
processes by which every species independently comes to reach
this very outcome. Therefore, we believe that asking yes/no
questions makes us less likely to unveil the sub-processes
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FIGURE 1 | Uni-dimensional vs. Multi-dimensional approaches to (cognitive) phylogenies. The figure is meant to represent the fact that traditional, tree-like
cognitive phylogenies can only be entertained if we adopt uni-dimensional approaches. As soon as we integrate information across levels of description
(multi-dimensional approaches), the topology of cognitive phylogenies changes dramatically, to the point of being unhelpful to depict descent.
that most probably lie beneath the emergence of cognitive
profiles.
In this context it is worth bearing in mind Buzsáki’s (2005)
remark that it is a rather dangerous strategy for a research to
start off from aman-created word or concept (he lists orientation,
voluntary movement, and dead reckoning, in the context of
spatial navigation, but virtually any node label of current
cognitive phylogenies would do), because, in this way, it is likely
to be limited to the “brain mechanisms that may be responsible
for the generation of the conceived behavior.” Instead, the
Darwinian logic of descent with modification demands a
more widespread comparative basis. Also, the emphasis on
mechanisms demands a move away from locationalist (neo-
phrenologist) tendencies. As Poeppel (2012) put it, mapping is
not explaining. Behaviors, especially complex ones, will have to
be deconstructed, and reconstructed. One of the clearest cases in
support of our view comes from Schaafsma et al.’s (2015) attempt
to deconstruct and reconstruct the notion of Theory of Mind.
The end result (captured in their Figure 3) is a complex web
of properties that cannot possibly be mapped onto a standard
cladogram.
There is an obvious sense in which current proposals
concerning cognitive phylogenies continue to approach the
mind in very modular terms, using fairly traditional categories
(“syntax,” “phonology,” “semantics,” in the case of language) that
are not the currency that the brain transacts in (Shalom and
Poeppel, 2008). When trying to graft these traditional categories
onto phylogenetic trees, cognitive scientists make the same neo-
phrenologist mistake as neuroscientists trying to find “syntax” in
the brain. We think this is seriously misguided.
Yet another problem for current models of cognitive
phylogenies is that they do not abide by one very important
characteristic of the cladograms of the Evolution of Life: they
do not take the variable “time” as a common denominator.
Phylogenetic trees are constructed according to two dimensions:
species’ phenotypes being one and time, the other. This does
not work in the same way when taken to the level of
cognition, for the reason that what these latter trees show is
not the time a species took to reach a cognitive characteristic
compared to another species. So grafting cognitive traits onto
pre-established cladograms introduce an important temporal
disconnect.
Obviously, we don’t mean to discourage scientists from
making phylogenetic hypotheses. Like many, we regard
phylogenetic considerations as central to cognition. And we
certainly don’t want to suggest that the literature on proto-
language or the evolution of cooperation, etc. have yielded
no insights. The top-down perspective (and the cladistic
representations it naturally gives rise to) has proven useful in
identifying some key research areas and articulating important
research questions. But we think it is time they be complemented
with more bottom-up-oriented approaches to eventually get to
the underlying mechanisms.
The pitfalls and limitations of traditional phylogenetic
representations and tree-thinking are already well known to
biologists. Thus, Omland et al. (2008) claim that traditional
cladograms “misrepresent the evolutionary process.” Gregory
(2008) warns that “any given node . . . represents a diverse
assemblage . . .with a complex evolutionary history.” Degnan and
Rosenberg (2009) insist that “conflicting genealogical histories”
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and “branching patterns” exist, but we feel that in the case of
cognition, these are magnified. Species label may fit (more or
less) into cladograms, but cognitive faculties don’t. In line with
recent approaches like neurodiversity that stress the “spectrum”
character of variation (as do evo-devo approaches; cf. West-
Eberhard, 2005), without any clear-cut divide, we think it
important at this stage of research to stress descent at all possible
levels of description. In other words, since we are at an early
stage of research into these questions, there is still time to adopt
more suitable perspectives, and to orient inquiry squarely toward
brain-based hypotheses.
Likewise, evolutionary biologists have learned to conceive of
“phenotypic novelty” as “largely reorganizational rather than a
product of innovative genes” (West-Eberhard, 2005). Cognitive
biologists ought to adopt this perspective as well (For relevant
discussion, we again refer to Balari and Lorenzo, 2015).
In order to envisage cognitive phylogenies, we need to move
away from attempts to graft cognitive notions onto cladograms,
and instead decompose the cognitive mechanisms into (even)
lower-level functions to trace back their ancestry and the ways
in which these were mixed in novel ways. As de Waal and Ferrari
(2010, p. 201) promote: “what if we were to replace our obsession
with complex cognition with an exploration of basic processes?
Instead of asking which species can do X, the question would
become how does X actually work?” We suggest that we take as
a starting point low-level circuit functions (e.g., gain modulation,
phase coding, selective inhibition) that are instrumental for the
mechanistic, neural implementation of cognitive functions, and
we need to reason about these and how they combine to yield
better-known cognitive traits (for a good example, see Bosman
et al., 2014). Doing so may put us in a much better position to
take advantage of the fact that the very fabric of neurophysiology
(brain rhythms) is deeply conserved (Buzsáki et al., 2013). This
very factmaywell prove as central to cognitive biology as the deep
conservation of hox-genes (deep homology) was for the evo-devo
breakthrough.
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